On the (In)security of Approximate Computing Synthesis by Islam, Sheikh Ariful
On the (In)security of Approximate Computing
Synthesis
Sheikh Ariful Islam
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL 33620
Email: {sheikhariful}@mail.usf.edu
Abstract—The broad landscape of new applications requires
minimal hardware resources without any sacrifice in Quality-
of-Results. Approximate Computing (AC) has emerged to meet
the demands of data-rich applications. Although AC applies
techniques to improve the energy efficiency of error-tolerant
applications at the cost of computational accuracy, new challenges
in security threats of AC should be simultaneously addressed.
In this paper, we introduce the security vulnerability of the
concurrent AC synthesis. We analyze the threat landscape and
provide a broader view of the attack and defense strategy. As a
case study, we utilize AC synthesis technique to perform malicious
modifications in the synthesized approximate netlist. Similarly,
we provide a scalable defense framework for trustworthy AC
synthesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing number of ubiquitous embedded systems
(e.g., Internet-of-Things) that have emerged as compelling
platforms for complex applications. Application domains rang-
ing from signal processing to machine learning are data-
intensive. The potential of these applications is pervasive and
widespread. The applications running on small geometries
cannot achieve the quality of the results without incurring
a high computational cost. Besides, it is difficult to tune
design parameters once the design is in the field. Approximate
Computing (AC) has evolved in the lower level of computing
stack to address escalating challenges towards performance1
efficiency. AC has created a compelling case towards effi-
ciency beyond traditional low power techniques (e.g., DVFS,
clock/voltage gating, etc.). AC leverages the strength of ap-
proximation present in arithmetic modules (e.g., adder [1]–[3]
and multiplier [4], [5]). It offers a trade-off between efficiency
and accuracy. In reality, it is a new computing paradigm that
designers are currently considering throughout the pre-silicon
[6].
Additionally, there have been significant efforts on software-
level approximation techniques that run on top of deterministic
hardware [7]–[13]. Even if AC is efficient by itself, security is
misconstrued in the AC system that increases the consequences
of security failures. In the light of recent security requirement
for planet-scale IoT, we should integrate security mechanism
into the systems built on AC to ensure information assurance.
Current security practice is oriented from the application-
level to the bottom of the system (hardware). To envision
1Performance refers to power, area, timing, and energy of a system.
trustworthy and energy-efficient complex systems, there are
examples of attacks in the SW/HW boundary and mitigation
strategy. Although the security patch can be easily integrated
into unprotected software, vulnerabilities in the lower layer
(hardware) are often difficult to predict due to its immutability
and nonbypassability [14]. Moreover, the increasing complex-
ity of hardware tends to increase security vulnerability which
lacks clear visibility. Further, the rising need for an energy-
efficient system complicates the detection of security failures
during the design process. In light of the complexity and
heterogeneity of the system, we should extend the security
practice (attack and defense) for the end-to-end AC system.
A large number of error metrics are present in the AC
system to evaluate the objective function (accuracy). For
example, hamming distances, arithmetic difference, squared
error are commonly used as error metrics. However, security
requirements are absent both in Approximate Modules (AM)
[15] and Approximate Synthesis (AS) [16]–[18]. Moreover,
the security demand of the applications running on top of the
end user’s device (constructed with AM) may vary. Hence, the
security model of the module and the synthesis technique can
meet the requirements that apply.
In this paper, we focus on the trustworthiness of approxi-
mate synthesis that should satisfy the real-time performance.
In particular, we provide a comprehensive framework to embed
malicious circuitry (also known as Hardware Trojan, HT) in
an approximate module that has a shorter activation period
and does not decrease the efficiency of the AC system. But
this would violate the integrity and trustworthiness of the
approximate computing system. We perform such attacks on
AS by using AM where some of AM are infected by HT while
the rest of AM are HT-free. The module information (HT-
free and/or HT-infected) is unknown to the system integrator.
As the current AS tool does not discriminate between secure
and non-secure AM, HT can be easily retrofitted into the
AC system. Moreover, given multi-objective requirements of
the AC system, design space exploration is possible, which
increases the complexity of HT detection. Hence, the current
AS technique can create systems with satisfactory performance
without any security guarantee. To enhance attack scalability,
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
01
20
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 D
ec
 20
19
the HT in a set of deterministic modules2 can also be utilized
with AM, with no predictable performance degradation from
deterministic subsystems.
Accordingly, a defender can employ easily verifiable se-
curity metrics to detect the presence of HT. As the error is
inherent in the AC system, traditional HT detection approaches
should be modified due to the large design space of the AC
system. As the design constraints of AM is unknown to a
defender, the detection technique also needs to be flexible (e.g.,
multi-voltage multi-mode analysis). Similarly, due to the large
HT space, the defender might additionally be concerned with
the security of deterministic modules or subsystems. Hence,
for all extant AC systems that lack HT detection capabilities,
we provide a robust path based detection technique satisfying
the perceived accuracy requirements. To the best of authors’
knowledge, this is the first work that quantifies security as
a functional requirement which is consequential as regular
performance. The novelty and contributions of the proposed
approach are:
• scalable and untrustworthy approximate synthesis frame-
work to include out-of-spec components in approximate
netlist while maintaining pre-defined accuracy.
• comprehensive detection framework using error and path
profiling considering the presence of a wide range of HT
instances in the approximate netlist.
• easy integration of both attack and defense framework
into current synthesis flow.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides an overview of related works on the security of
approximate computing. Sections III and IV describe the attack
model and related definitions. Section V proposes the attack
and detection mechanism of malicious insertions respectively.
Section VI presents the detection rate without any knowledge
of the golden design. Section VII draws the conclusion fol-
lowed by future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the current state of security prac-
tice in Approximate Computing, although significant improve-
ment in modeling, error analysis, functional approximation,
and CAD have been recognized. As our focus in this paper is to
analyze the security vulnerability of AC synthesis, we present
the ongoing works that affect the overall trustworthiness of
AC.
Regazzoni et al. [19] provide an in-depth study about
the possible hardware security for the AC system. Although
the authors mention the potential of security failures, the
techniques to address these violations are not addressed.
Moreover, there is no mention of security enhancement at
a higher abstraction level. Yellu et al. [20] mention some
progress in security threats of four broad domains, namely,
circuit, storage, software, and system for AC. No attempt has
been made to define security objectives during synthesis to
2Deterministic modules are commonly used for realizing security critical
function (e.g., S-box in AES).
ensure scalable trustworthiness during pre- and post-silicon
AC system. Moreover, many security gaps still exist due
to fundamental reusable requirements during any synthesis
technique.
Venkataramani et al. [17] propose technique as to how to
embed regular Observability Don’t Care (ODC) during AC
synthesis, which can simplify the Boolean equations. The
method reduces the original variables set that do not directly
influence the primary outputs. However, techniques remain for
inserting Hardware Trojan in Register Transfer Level (RTL)
don’t care condition [21]. Nepal et al. [16] presented Auto-
mated Behavioral Approximate Circuit Synthesis (ABACUS)
of RTL description that employs widely used NSGA-II [22] to
obtain Pareto frontiers of AC system. Thorough optimizations
of Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) from RTL design are utilized
to enhance the accuracy of AC circuits with no incorporation
of trustworthiness. Lee et al. [18] presented a high-level
synthesis (HLS) framework for approximating loop-based pro-
gram behavior. Although HLS provides a higher abstraction
for architectural synthesis, the authors did not mention any
synthesis modification towards approximate trustworthiness.
Unlike previous techniques, our technique (a) does consider
any attribute of AM that can be exploited to introduce any
modifications into existing AC synthesis and (b) presents an
effective and scalable approach to detect any such modifica-
tions early on during the hardware design life cycle (HDLC).
III. THREAT MODEL
We assume an attacker can control the entire life cycle
of the AC system if h/she can include the stealthy behavior
into legacy reusable hardware components (e.g., arithmetic
modules). Hence, an attacker would modify the specified
function with less clear untrusted properties for various attack
objectives. Moreover, the fundamental improvements on Com-
mercial Off The Shelf (COTS) intellectual property with no
security verification makes security assurance of AC synthesis
questionable. During pre-silicon, third-party approximate IP
vendors can modify parts of the design and sell to the
particular IP buyer where the buyer may be fabless design
house. Even if these modifications are visible during functional
verification, they are stealthy during trust verification of the
composite system. Although the AC system will perform sat-
isfactorily despite the mere presence of untrusted components,
the precise specifications of undesired properties (e.g., small
change in design) may leak secret information (e.g., key)
and synthesis configurations to help in overbuilding, introduce
incorrect functionality during rare triggering event, cause early
failure of the device, etc.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Approximate modules constitute a significant source of se-
curity vulnerability in approximate computing synthesis. Two
fundamental properties, namely, error and power, are inherent
in AM and can be exploited during hardware synthesis to
perform malicious changes. The changes should appear with
the same likelihood as a regular bug in hardware, be extensible
to operate during the unsafe condition and have a certain
degree of connectivity to appear as payload at design outputs.
On the contrary, knowing and understanding the design for
security early in HDLC can reduce the related risks and testing
of the synthesized netlist.
If we denote approximate module as AMji with error (E
j
i )
and power (Pji ), an attacker objective is to modify AM
j′
i′ with
new error (δEj
′
i′ ) and power (δP
j′
i′ ). Here i denotes different
architectures (e.g., 1- and 2-bit approximate adder) of j type
operation (e.g., adder, multiplier). The required changes in
error and power are dictated by the synthesis objectives that
AC can tolerate on the approximate gate-level netlist. If the
synthesized netlist can encompass error (E’) and power (P’),
the following two constraints must satisfy:
E′ −
∑
j=1
∑
i=1
Eji < δE (1)
P ′ −
∑
j=1
∑
i=1
P ji < δP (2)
Note that, all AMs can not satisfy the above constraints.
Hence, an attacker would resort to iterative approach and
develop a non-unified technique. On the contrary, a defender
should carefully infer the distribution of error (δE) and power
(δP) to detect the presence of modified AMs.
V. PROPOSED ATTACK AND DETECTION TECHNIQUE
A. Malicious insertion in AC synthesis
Current threats on hardware are often focused on the entity
that does not participate in HDLC. For example, an attacker in
manufacturing and test can embed untrustworthy components
in the design. However, opportunities exist for malevolent
actors during pre-silicon to exercise high-impact damage and
leaks. An attacker can systematically evaluate the AM to gauge
its security threats in the future which makes minimal use
of AM. We show such an attack framework in Fig. 1. The
description of the framework is given as follows.
Given access to approximate module library (architectures)
and synthesis tool, an attacker would exploit the library and
tool while still meeting the specified critical requirements
of approximate design objectives. For example, approximate
adder and multiplier [2] architectures are publicly available.
First, we characterize each module architectures in terms of
the objective function (accuracy, power, and rare triggering
nets). Then, we perform functional simulation to understand
whether a particular architecture can be maliciously attacked.
To enforce approximate parameters (accuracy and power)
while making the module vulnerable, we change the traditional
design objectives of approximate synthesis as follows:
Cost = Wa,p ∗ (Accuracy+Power)+Wr ∗Rare_nets (3)
where, Wa,p denotes the combined weights of accuracy
and power, and Wr indicates the rare switching nets available
within a module architecture. We keep priority weights (Wa,p
and Wr) to 0.5. We perform an independent assessment
of each module to determine the suitability of malicious
modifications. Then, we rank the architectures of a particular
module type (adder or multiplier) that show realistic adversar-
ial behavior while meeting approximation criteria. We impose
the following constraints while choosing a module for HT
insertion:
• the module showing higher error (less accuracy) is more
susceptible to malicious modification.
• perform retiming and/or relaxing the paths that show
timing error due to approximation and HT.
As there lacks standard threat infrastructure, we follow
the automated HT insertion framework [23] to measure the
success of various HTs. Another challenge lies in checking
the HT infected design for attack success, which can be
solved by using SCOAP [24] for measuring controllability and
observability. To broaden the attack surface and search time,
we also provide HT-free modules to the approximate synthesis
tool. Depending on synthesis tool configurations, we generate
different synthesized netlists of the same functionality and pass
it to the lower level (e.g., layout-level). The generated netlist
does not include any information related to the vulnerability
of design.
Approx. Arch. Type (1) Approx. Arch. Type (3)Approx. Arch. Type (2) Approx. Arch. Type (n)
Characterization
Accuracy Power Rare triggering nets
Ranked order
Approx. Archs.
Hardware Trojan 
Approx. 
Synthesis Tool
 Design to be 
synthesized (D)
Synthesized 
Netlist (1)
Synthesized 
Netlist (2)
Synthesized 
Netlist (3)
Synthesized 
Netlist (n)
HT-free
Possible-HT
Trojan Free Module 
Library
Fig. 1: HT insertion framework in AC synthesis flow (bottom-
up approach).
B. Detection of malicious modification in AC synthesis
While approximate systems have seen significant innova-
tion recently, critical issues, namely system-wide security
vulnerability detection, remain unanswered. Due to the large
design space of the synthesized netlist of approximate systems,
there are substantial new challenges to detect any malicious
modification. Firstly, the functionality of critical function (e.g.,
encryption) should not be fault-tolerant; hence, a designer
typically avoids approximating such function. However, fault-
tolerant applications (e.g., image processing) send/receive sig-
nals to/from critical function (e.g., biometric authentication). If
the modifications are performed in fault-tolerant design (e.g.,
filter), the potential consequences are disastrous. Secondly, the
vast optimization opportunities during approximate synthesis
leave the current detection techniques only to the existing
attack surface. Thirdly, approximate computing leverages cost-
efficient data movement across different datapath units. Hence,
datapath components exhibit a higher potential for intentional
modifications. Finally, the security protocol must be able to
handle the heterogeneity of accuracy and power objectives of
underlying approximate modules at multiple scales.
The security of the approximate system depends on the
security of approximate modules plus the deterministic mod-
ules. To understand the security vulnerability, it is essential to
consider the conditions when any approximate module would
be a rogue agent.
Consider the synthesized gate-level netlists from approxi-
mate synthesis tool (e.g., [16]) or industry-standard tool (e.g.,
Design Compiler) in Fig. 2. To a defender, he does not have
access to a golden netlist or approximate modules. Hence, he
has to find a “provably secure and energy-efficient” design
using a systematic approach. The search is more expensive
if approximate computing circuits are domain-specific and
deployed in IoT infrastructure. Hence, ad-hoc security pro-
cedures are too expensive to localize malicious modification.
While the analysis of design behavior is relatively easy for
energy efficiency, the same is not true for security analysis.
A defender then requires the formal treatment of energy effi-
ciency of approximate computing to reason about the security
vulnerability.
Given n netlists where the HT is carefully crafted for some
netlists, a defender has to find the netlist where HT is present
and localize the approximate modules with embedded HT.
A key challenge to this localization is that each netlist has
an equal probability of being HT-infected and there can be
versatile HTs either in approximate or deterministic module(s).
For simplicity of analysis, we assume the traditional side-
channel analysis is effective for HT detection in the deter-
ministic module. However, side-channel leakage can be still
applied for approximate modules. Further, we consider only
combinational HT due to the limitation of the approximate
synthesis tool [16]. Different netlists would exhibit a different
amount of accuracy. Generally, the Least Significant Bit (LSB)
of arithmetic modules is mostly approximated as they are
error-tolerant [4] and provide higher savings compared to
approximating Most Significant Bit (MSB) of operands.
Among n netlists with no specification of error and power,
a defender wants to capitalize on the success of various
techniques. As the LSB of an input word provides most ap-
proximations, an attacker would fall into embedding malicious
components into LSB. As the model for approximation is
unknown to the defender, the pervasiveness of error requires
a defender to profile the netlist with input vector streams to
determine the extent of the error. Due to heterogeneity of the
netlist components, it should be possible for a defender to
rank order the netlists based on error. Simultaneously, he can
perform the path profiling to make it easier to determine N
near-critical paths from the multi-voltage multi-mode analysis.
During approximation, many near-critical paths show timing
error due to voltage scaling. Hence, the paths from the slack
distribution that do not violate timing constraints are possible
sources of HT. Once these paths are found, one can easily
find the modules that contain such path(s). The localization of
these modules can be further examined to determine the nature
of the module (approximate versus deterministic). However, it
should be noted that if the HT is present in both types of
modules, it will make it harder to detect the presence and
timing of HT triggering signal.
Synthesized 
Netlist (1)
HT-free
Possible-HT
Synthesized 
Netlist (2)
Synthesized 
Netlist (3)
Synthesized 
Netlist (n)
Error Profiling Input Vector
Error-based 
Ranked order
Netlist
Path Profiling
Netlist (1)
Deter. Approx.
Netlist (2)
Deter. Approx.
Netlist (3)
Deter. Approx.
Netlist (n)
Deter. Approx.
*Deter. (Deterministic)
*Approx. (Approximate)
Fig. 2: HT detection framework in AC synthesis flow (top-
down approach).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To stage an attack in an approximating computing system,
we first evaluate the HT vulnerability of approximate adders
[2] and approximate multipliers [5], [25] as mentioned in
Section V-A. The accuracy of individual adder and multiplier
architecture in the literature [2], [5], [25] which we use in Eqn.
3. Next, we simulate the design under 1000 correlated input
vectors [26] to determine the power profile of an individual
module. For the same input streams, we use Synopsys VCS
[27] to calculate the rare triggering nets from the SAIF
(Switching Activity Interchange Format) file. To use this infor-
mation during synthesis, we use Synopsys Library Compiler
[28] to build a database of HT vulnerable approximate blocks.
Then both HT-free and HT infected module architectures are
used as input to a modified version of ABACUS [16]. We
generate ten different netlists of a design based on Pareto
fronts. We evaluate the proposed attack for two designs (FFT
and FIR) available in ABACUS. The attack goal for both DSP
cores is to transfer the filter coefficients to the outputs when a
particular input sequence occurs. We have observed that with
power overhead < 2%, we are able to determine the coefficients
without introducing any additional hardware errors.
During detection, we simulate each netlist under random
and correlated input streams. After the simulation, we get the
error (%) that an approximate netlist can tolerate. We sort the
netlists based on the ascending order of error (%). For higher
confidence, we perform static timing analysis (STA) using
Synopsys Primetime. We extract the paths that do not violate
the given timing constraints (here 10ns), and we locate the
modules (approximate or deterministic) crossing these paths.
We further generate test vectors to test the error resilience
of the individual module. The modules having the lowest
resilience are confirmed as HT vulnerable.
Similar to attack framework, we apply the above-mentioned
detection technique and identify the rare nets responsible for
leaking the coefficients in designs (FFT and FIR). We detect
the HT vulnerable nets and modules with an average accuracy
of 90% (false positive is 8%, and false-negative is 2%).
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present an attack and defense framework for robust
modifications and detect such modifications on approximate
computing synthesis. During the modifications, an attacker
ranks the available approximate modules based on accuracy,
power, and rare activity nets. On the contrary, during de-
tection, a defender utilizes the input vectors to characterize
the approximate modules followed by robust path profiling.
Both frameworks can be integrated seamlessly in regular
design automation flow without detailed views of lower-
level approximate computing circuits. Finally, we use open
source approximate modules and approximate synthesis tool
to perform attack and defense. In the future, we plan to
extend the extending the synthesis tool to include security
processing features based on micro-architecture parameters of
approximate computing.
REFERENCES
[1] Honglan Jiang, Jie Han, and Fabrizio Lombardi. A comparative review
and evaluation of approximate adders. In Proceedings of the 25th Edition
on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI ’15, pages 343–348,
New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[2] M. Shafique, W. Ahmad, R. Hafiz, and J. Henkel. A low latency generic
accuracy configurable adder. In 2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design
Automation Conference (DAC), pages 1–6, June 2015.
[3] M. A. Hanif, R. Hafiz, O. Hasan, and M. Shafique. Quad: Design
and analysis of quality-area optimal low-latency approximate adders.
In 2017 54th ACM/EDAC/IEEE Design Automation Conference (DAC),
pages 1–6, June 2017.
[4] S. Hashemi, R. I. Bahar, and S. Reda. DRUM: A Dynamic Range
Unbiased Multiplier for approximate applications. In 2015 IEEE/ACM
International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD), pages
418–425, Nov 2015.
[5] P. Kulkarni, P. Gupta, and M. Ercegovac. Trading accuracy for power
with an underdesigned multiplier architecture. In 2011 24th Internatioal
Conference on VLSI Design, pages 346–351, Jan 2011.
[6] Medium. https://medium.com/zetta-venture-partners/
new-strategy-in-computing-approximate-computing-1c72065ead07.
[7] A Agarwal, M. C. Rinard, S. Sidiroglou, S. Misailovic, and H. Hoff-
mann. Using Code Perforation to Improve Performance, Reduce Energy
Consumption, and Respond to Failures. 2009.
[8] D. Palomino, M. Shafique, A. Susin, and J. Henkel. Thermal optimiza-
tion using adaptive approximate computing for video coding. In 2016
Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), pages
1207–1212, March 2016.
[9] H. Esmaeilzadeh, A. Sampson, L. Ceze, and D. Burger. Neural
Acceleration for General-Purpose Approximate Programs. In 2012
45th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture,
pages 449–460, Dec 2012.
[10] S. Venkataramani, A. Ranjan, K. Roy, and A. Raghunathan. AxNN:
Energy-efficient neuromorphic systems using approximate computing.
In 2014 IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Low Power Electronics
and Design (ISLPED), pages 27–32, Aug 2014.
[11] R. P. Challa, S. Ariful Islam, and S. Katkoori. An SR Flip-Flop
based Physical Unclonable Functions for Hardware Security. In 2019
IEEE 62nd International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(MWSCAS), pages 574–577, Aug 2019.
[12] S. A. Islam and S. Katkoori. High-level synthesis of key based
obfuscated RTL datapaths. In 2018 19th International Symposium on
Quality Electronic Design (ISQED), pages 407–412, March 2018.
[13] V. Laguduva, S. A. Islam, S. Aakur, S. Katkoori, and R. Karam. Machine
learning based iot edge node security attack and countermeasures. In
2019 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI),
pages 670–675, July 2019.
[14] R. Lee, S. Sethumadhavan, and G. E. Suh. Hardware Enhanced
Security. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, CCS ’12, pages 1052–1052, New York,
NY, USA, 2012. ACM.
[15] S. Mazahir, O. Hasan, and M. Shafique. Adaptive approximate com-
puting in arithmetic datapaths. IEEE Design Test, 35(4):65–74, Aug
2018.
[16] K. Nepal, S. Hashemi, H. Tann, R. I. Bahar, and S. Reda. Automated
high-level generation of low-power approximate computing circuits.
IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing, 7(1):18–30, Jan
2019.
[17] S. Venkataramani, A. Sabne, V. Kozhikkottu, K. Roy, and A. Raghu-
nathan. SALSA: Systematic logic synthesis of approximate circuits. In
DAC Design Automation Conference 2012, pages 796–801, June 2012.
[18] S. Lee, L. K. John, and A. Gerstlauer. High-level Synthesis of
Approximate Hardware Under Joint Precision and Voltage Scaling. In
Proceedings of the Conference on Design, Automation & Test in Europe,
DATE ’17, pages 187–192, 2017.
[19] F. Regazzoni, C. Alippi, and I. Polian. Security: The Dark Side of Ap-
proximate Computing? In Proceedings of the International Conference
on Computer-Aided Design, ICCAD ’18, pages 44:1–44:6, New York,
NY, USA, 2018. ACM.
[20] P. Yellu, N. Boskov, M. A. Kinsy, and Q. Yu. Security Threats in
Approximate Computing Systems. In Proceedings of the 2019 on Great
Lakes Symposium on VLSI, GLSVLSI ’19, pages 387–392, New York,
NY, USA, 2019. ACM.
[21] N. Fern, S. Kulkarni, and K. T. Cheng. Hardware Trojans hidden in RTL
don’t cares âA˘Tˇ Automated insertion and prevention methodologies. In
2015 IEEE International Test Conference (ITC), pages 1–8, Oct 2015.
[22] K. Deb, A. Pratap, S. Agarwal, and T. Meyarivan. A fast and elitist
multiobjective genetic algorithm: NSGA-II. IEEE Transactions on
Evolutionary Computation, 6(2):182–197, April 2002.
[23] J. Cruz, Y. Huang, P. Mishra, and S. Bhunia. An automated configurable
trojan insertion framework for dynamic trust benchmarks. In 2018
Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), pages
1598–1603, March 2018.
[24] L. H. Goldstein and E. L. Thigpen. Scoap: Sandia controllabil-
ity/observability analysis program. In 17th Design Automation Con-
ference, pages 190–196, June 1980.
[25] S. Rehman, W. El-Harouni, M. Shafique, A. Kumar, J. Henkel, and
J. Henkel. Architectural-space exploration of approximate multipliers. In
2016 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design
(ICCAD), pages 1–8, Nov 2016.
[26] S. A. Islam, L. K. Sah, and S. Katkoori. Empirical word-level analysis
of arithmetic module architectures for hardware trojan susceptibility.
In 2018 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
(AsianHOST), pages 109–114, Dec 2018.
[27] Synopsys VCS. https://www.synopsys.com/verification/simulation/vcs.
html.
[28] Synopsys Library Compiler. https://www.synopsys.com/verification/
virtual-prototyping/saber/capabilities/modeling-tools.html.
